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    <description>Cybersecurity stories, one breach at a time. A static blog — no accounts, no ads, no tracking.</description>
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      <title>No Auth, 164 Million Records: The Malawi Credit Bureau Exposure</title>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A Kibana dashboard with zero authentication exposed the entire Malawian credit bureau — 2.4 million full identity profiles, 49 million loan records and live application logs — to anyone who knew the IP.</description>
      <author>FirewallFables</author>
      <category>Data Exposure</category>
      <category>Cloud Security</category>
      <category>Hardening</category>
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    <item>
      <title>The Registry That Called Everyone: 265 Million Numbers Exposed at India&apos;s DND</title>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Two unauthenticated CouchDB nodes held India&apos;s entire Do-Not-Disturb registry — 245 million phone preferences, 7 million consent records and full residential PII — behind nothing but an open port.</description>
      <author>FirewallFables</author>
      <category>Data Exposure</category>
      <category>Cloud Security</category>
      <category>Incident Response</category>
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      <title>Shai-Hulud Supply Chain Attack</title>
      <link>https://firewallfables.com/blog/shai-hulud-supply-chain-attack/</link>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How a self-spreading npm worm turned stolen maintainer tokens into a cascading supply-chain compromise across hundreds of packages.</description>
      <author>FirewallFables</author>
      <category>Supply Chain</category>
      <category>Malware</category>
      <category>npm</category>
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      <title>The SQLite File That Exposed a Monitoring Environment</title>
      <link>https://firewallfables.com/blog/grafana-to-zabbix-chain/</link>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A three-year-old Grafana path traversal led to a plaintext database, then to Zabbix API access, then to a full infrastructure map.</description>
      <author>FirewallFables</author>
      <category>Incident Response</category>
      <category>Monitoring</category>
      <category>Hardening</category>
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      <title>365,000 Attacks in Seven Days: What a TPOT Honeypot Sees on the Open Internet</title>
      <link>https://firewallfables.com/blog/tpot-honeypot-on-azure/</link>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>One Azure VM, one week, 365,000 logged events. root/123456 at the top of the credential charts, SIP and SSH at the top of the port charts, and cloud providers doing most of the shooting.</description>
      <author>FirewallFables</author>
      <category>Threat Intelligence</category>
      <category>Honeypot</category>
      <category>Cloud Security</category>
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      <title>It Types Faster Than You Do: USB HID Attacks with a Rubber Ducky</title>
      <link>https://firewallfables.com/blog/usb-hid-attacks-rubber-ducky/</link>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A stick that looks like a thumb drive enumerates as a keyboard — no driver, no prompt, no consent. In a lab: Defender switched off, a logon-triggered PowerShell reverse shell on Windows, and root persistence with the logs wiped on Linux.</description>
      <author>FirewallFables</author>
      <category>Hardware Security</category>
      <category>Red Teaming</category>
      <category>Persistence</category>
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      <title>Harbor Default Credentials: A Case Study in Container Registry Security</title>
      <link>https://firewallfables.com/blog/harbor-registry-default-credentials/</link>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>An exposed container registry with default credentials hands an attacker the entire software supply chain — images, secrets, source code.</description>
      <author>FirewallFables</author>
      <category>Container Security</category>
      <category>Supply Chain</category>
      <category>Hardening</category>
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      <title>One GET Request, One Production Backend: Anatomy of a .env Exposure</title>
      <link>https://firewallfables.com/blog/one-get-request-one-production-backend/</link>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 15 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A single unauthenticated HTTP GET returned the entire production secrets bundle for a customer-facing WhatsApp lead-generation bot — database, messaging provider, voice AI, LLM proxy and webhook secrets, all served as plain text.</description>
      <author>FirewallFables</author>
      <category>Incident Response</category>
      <category>Hardening</category>
      <category>Secrets Management</category>
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